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I. INTRODUCTION
Individuals rely on a variety of different sources for de-
pendable data about important issues. Certain agencies or
associations specifically hold themselves out as experts in a
field and provide information to their members in exchange
for fees, benefits to reputation, and/or political lobbying
power. These associations, whether for profit or not, gain by
inducing their members and the public to rely on the infor-
mation they distribute. However, these agencies do not al-
ways properly research the advice they proffer. In these in-
stances, should such associations be able to use the First
Amendment to protect themselves from liability for the rec-
ommendations they make?
I believe that these associations should not be able to hold
themselves out as experts and then use the First Amendment
as a shield from liability if they are wrong and they cause
physical harm. The Northern District of Illinois reached this
conclusion in an opinion' discussed in the first section of this
Comment.2 When trade associations distribute information
negligently such that physical harm is caused to third par-
ties, they should be held responsible. With that premise in
mind, this Comment also suggests strategies for plaintiffs
who seek to hold trade associations liable for such acts.3
The second section of this Comment focuses on the First
J.D. Candidate 2000, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Thanks to my
husband and family for their love and support. Thanks to David Shrager, Esq. for
giving me the opportunity to work on the case that inspired this Comment.
See In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig., 25 F. Supp. 2d 837
(N.D. Ill. 1998) [hereinafter In re Blood Prods. Litig.]
2 See infra Section II.
See infra Section Ill.
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Amendment summary judgment arguments made by the de-
fendant, National Hemophilia Foundation' ("NHF"), and the
arguments in opposition to summary judgment made by the
plaintiffs, hemophiliacse who contracted HW from contami-
nated factor concentrate, in In re Factor VlII or IX Concentrate
Blood Products Litigation (hereinafter In re Blood Products Liti-
gation).7 This part concludes with an examination of the
Northern District of Illinois' denial of NHF's motion for sum-
mary judgment.
In light of the court's denial of summary judgment, the
third section of this Comment focuses on potential negligence
arguments the plaintiffs can make in their respective trials
against NHF. These arguments include negligent perform-
ance of a voluntary undertaking, negligent misrepresentation,
and concert of action. The degree to which such arguments
will be successful will vary depending on whether each plain-
tiffs jurisdiction has adopted certain sections of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts ("Restatement") or some version of
such sections. In outlining some of these strategies for es-
tablishing liability, I have focused on the laws of states that
likely will be amenable to such arguments by plaintiffs. The
arguments outlined are also applicable to other plaintiffs who
seek to defeat trade associations' use of the First Amendment
as a shield from liability for the physical harm that misinfor-
mation may cause.
II. IN RE FACTOR VII OR IX CONCENTRATE
BLOOD PRODUCTS LITIGATION
A. Background
Hemophiliacs, who contracted HIV through transfusions
4 NHF is a nonprofit organization that provided Information during the late 1970s
and 1980s to hemophiliacs and physicians about the blood products used to treat
bleeding episodes caused by hemophilia. See In re Blood Prods. LUIg.. 25 F. Supp. 2d
at 837.
5 "[Hemophilia is the most common severe. inherited coagulation disorder."
ESSENTIALS OF MEDICINE 409 (Thomas E. Andreoll et al. eds.. 3d ed. 1993). Many
victims of the disorder suffer from spontaneous and trauma-induced hemorrhaging.
See id. at 410. Such bleeding episodes are commonly treated with replacement ther-
apy, whereby concentrates of Factor VIII or IX are infused to raise the plasma levels
of these elements to hemostatic levels. See d.
6 HIV is an abbreviation for human immunodeficlency virus, the virus that can
cause acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). HIV can be transmitted, among
other ways, through transfusion of contaminated blood and blood products. See Id.
at 702.
7 In re Blood Prods. Lilig., 25 F. Supp. at 837.
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with clotting factor concentrate, sued the manufacturers of
the products and, in some cases, NHF. NHF is a nonprofit
organization that seeks to promote "'programs of research;
patient, public and professional education; and patient, fam-
ily and community services.' The NHF also develops medical
treatment standards or recommendations which are dissemi-
nated and relied upon by physicians in their treatment of
persons with hemophilia."' NHF membership includes state
chapters, medical providers and the leading members of the
plasma industry.10
In their complaint against NHF, plaintiffs claimed first
"that the NHF established itself as the 'preeminent authority'
and 'principal educator' on medical treatment issues impact-
ing persons with hemophilia."" Second, plaintiffs asserted
that, "early in the AIDS epidemic, the NHF assumed a leader-
ship role in informing, guiding and educating hemophiliacs,
their treaters, and the media regarding the proper treatment
of hemophilia in light of the [HIV and] AIDS risk." 12 Plaintiffs
further alleged that, in this role, NHF negligently recom-
mended that they continue using factor concentrate to treat
their bleeding episodes when it knew or should have known
that the plaintiffs could, and likely would, contract HIV from
such products.'3 Thus, plaintiffs asserted that as a result of
NHF's negligent acts, they continued to undergo treatment
with factor concentrate and thus contracted HIV. 4
B. NHF's Motion for Summary Judgment
First Amendment Arguments
In response to the lawsuit against it, NHF fied a motion
for summary judgment. 5 NHF argued that liability on the
8 The four manufacturer defendants in Multi-District Litigation ("MDL") 986 are
Baxter Healthcare Corporation, Bayer Corporation, Alpha Therapeutic Corporation
and Armour Pharmaceutical Company. There has been a mass settlement of the
suits against these defendants and their liability is not addressed in this Comment.9 In re Blood Prods. Litig.. 25 F. Supp. 2d at 839. The plaintiffs' lawsuits wcreconsolidated in the Northern District of Illinois for pretrial purposes, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1407 (1984 & Supp. 1996). These cases will be remanded for trials to the
various states in which they were filed. Thus, with regard to the later sections of this
Comment, which discuss the negligence arguments to be made by plaintiffs in their





13 See id. at 840.
14 See id.
'5 See Brief of NHF at 15, In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig.,
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basis of its communications would abridge its First Amend-
ment rights of free speech and free press. 6 Thus, NHF con-
tended that the First Amendment provides an absolute shield
from tort suits that allege negligent communications.' In the
alternative, NHF contended that "it may only be held liable for
misstatements only under a malice or 'calculated falsehood'
standard." 8 Finally, NHF asserted that "the First Amendment
offers a qualified privilege because NHF publications reported
on issues of public concern," and that liability cannot attach
for its failure to warn because the First Amendment protects
it from liability for not speaking.1 9
NHF claimed it "never sought to be the sole or controlling
source of... information" for persons with hemophilia and
their physicians; rather, it considered itself to be a voice "pre-
senting one of many possible viewpoints worthy of considera-
tion." NHF warned that "imposition of tort liability upon [it
for the] treatment recommendations it [promulgated] ...
would have a chilling effect on all voluntary medical societies
and nonprofit organizations which seek to add to the public
debate on any medical issue."2'
C. Plaintiffs' Counter-Arguments to
N-IFs First Amendment Arguments
The plaintiffs, in addition to laying out their negligence ar-
guments, argued that the First Amendment does not "immu-
nize an association like NHF from liability for conduct
amounting to negligence" simply because the negligence took
25 F. Supp. 2d 837 (N.D. m. 1998) (No. 93 C 7452) [hereinafter Brief of NHFI.
16 See id. at 3
17 See id.
18 Id. at 8 (arguing based on Time, Inc. v. Hill. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). that It could
"not be held liable for printing provably false information... without a showing that
NHF knew the Information] was false or [acted]... with recldess disregard for the
truth-).
19 In re Blood Prods. Litig., 25 F. Supp. 2d at 840. See also Brief of NHF at 8 (No.
93 C 7452) (relying on Concerned Consumers League v. O'Neill. 371 F. Supp. 644
(E.D. Wis. 1974). to argue that it should be shielded by the First Amendment from
liability because it distributed information regarding the AIDS virus, which was a
matter of public concern).
Brief of NHF at 2 (No. 93 C 7452).
21 Id. at 15. See also Kimberly J. Todd, Snyder v. American Association of Blood
Banks: Expansion of Trade Association Liabift-Does it Reach Medical Societies. 29
U. Tol. L. Rev. 149, 175 (1997] (concluding that the court's recognition of trade asso-
ciation liability for negligent promulgation of standards will paveO the way for future
application of its reasoning to medical societies which develop medical practice pa-
rameters-).
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the form of words or speech.' 2 Plaintiffs cited the principle
from Schenck v. United States23 that First Amendment protec-
tion, no matter how fundamental, is not absolute. 24
The plaintiffs asserted "that the role being assumed by the
party seeking the refuge of the First Amendment is the key to
determining whether the First Amendment actually applies. 25
Although NHF had characterized "itself as a mere consumer
advocacy group or a traditional member of the press,"26 the
plaintiffs countered that "NHF's role in the AIDS epidemic
[was that] of the chief producer and disseminator of AIDS re-
lated information, medical advice, and physician practice
standards to and for the benefit of persons with hemophilia
and their [medical providers]." 2' The plaintiffs further argued
that the protection afforded to the press by the First Amend-
ment does not extend to laws that apply generally to all citi-
zens of the United States.'m The plaintiffs asserted that even
if NHF was a member of the press, it still had to "abide by
laws of general applicability, even though such laws... im-
pose[d] incidental burdens on the ability.., to gather and
report the news."2' "The rationale underlying these [argu-
ments is] that there is no threat to a free press in requiring
[NHF's] agents to act within the [limits of] the law."30 Thus,
the plaintiffs argued that NHF is subject to the common law
of negligence and must conform its conduct to generally ap-
plicable standards of care.3
22 Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to National Hemophilia Foundation's Motion for
Summary Judgment at 40-41, In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig.,
25 F. Supp. 2d 837 (N.D. M11. 1998) (No. 93 C 7452) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Briefl].
23 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (holding that whether or not a given utterance Is pro-
tected by the First Amendment depends on the circumstances).
24 Plaintiffs' Brief at 41. Plaintiffs also cited Clift v. Naragansett Television L.P..
688 A-2d 805 (R-I. 1996), in which the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that a
television station could be held liable for causing a man to commit suicide by negli-
gently broadcasting a telephone interview with him during a sensitive negotiation
period. See id. at 43-44.
25 Id. at 42.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 42-43.
2 See id. at 44 (citing Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991), and Food
Lion Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 923 (M.D.N.C. 1997), both of
which held that generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment).
29 Id. at 45 (citing Risenhoover v. England, 936 F. Supp. 392 (W.D. Tex. 1996),
which held that the First Amendment does not immunize a newspaper or television
station from liability for negligence associated with news gathering activities).30id.
31 See id. at 46.
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D. The Northern District of Ilinois' Denial
of NHF"s Motion for Summary Judgment
In denying NHFs First Amendment-based motion for
summary judgment, the Northern District of Illinois ad-
dressed each of NHFIs arguments.32
1. Freedom of speech and press
The court first addressed NHFIs argument that its publi-
cations were entitled to absolute First Amendment protection
of speech and press.' The court acknowledged that NHF
could be treated as a member of the press under Liberty
Lobby, Inc. v. Rees,3 and that its freedoms of speech and
press are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against
abridgement by the states.3 The court also conceded that
imposition of tort liability is sufficient state action to impli-
cate the First Amendment3
The court, however, disagreed with NHF's contention that
because its speech was noncommercial it could only be
stripped of protection if it constituted libel, obscenity, incite-
ment or fighting words.' The court determined that NHF's
reliance on Bigelow v. Virginia? was misplaced because that
case did not hold that those four categories of speech are the
only ones that lack First Amendment protection. 3 The court
held that NIF's argument was further "belied by a consider-
able body of law denying First Amendment protection in
situations not involving obscenity, libel, incitement or fighting
words."'
32 The courts summary rejection of NHFs argument that the First Amendment
protected its right not to speak Is not discussed. See In re Blood Prods. Lifig.. 25 F.
Supp. 2d 837, 848 (N.D. m. 1998).
See id. at 840.
111 F.R.D. 19, 20 (D.D.C. 1986) (noting that First Amendment protections of
news-gathering activities are not restricted to the writers of large established news-
papers and media enterprises, but are equally applicable to the sole publisher of a
newsletter or other writing distributed to the public to inform, comment or criticize).
35 See In re Blood Prods. Litig., 25 F. Supp. 2d at 840 (citing Thornhill v. State of
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940)).
3 See id. (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254. 265 (1964). which
held that imposition of tort liability constitutes state action, which Implicates the
First and Fourteenth Amendments). In this case the action was being taken by a
federal court, but the court held that the analysis is the same. See &L
37 See id. at 841.
' 421 U.S. 809, 819 (1975).
See In re Blood Prods. Litlg.. 25 F. Supp. 2d at 841.
40 Id. (citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). which denied coverage of
speech that invaded privacy because there was malice, and Cohen v. Cowles Media
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The court cited Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,41 to show that
the protections of the First Amendment do not shield the
press from laws of general applicability.42 The court rejected
NHF's unsupported arguments that the principle of general
applicability operates only when the law in question governs
the business functions of the press and not when it governs
the content of the publications.' The court also focused on
the Supreme Court's holding in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,"
which recognized that the press may be held liable for defa-
mation under ordinary negligence principles.45  Lastly, the
court cited precedent that imposes "negligence liability on a
member of the press when physical injuries result from its
publication."46 As a result of these precedents, the court re-
jected NHF's argument for absolute First Amendment protec-
tion.
2. Liability for misstatements
NHF argued that misstatements alone should not subject
the association to liability. Quoting a passage from New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan that "[eirroneous statement is inevitable
in free debate, and.., must be protected if the freedoms of
expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they'need... to survive,'" NHF contended that the plaintiffs had
Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991), which denied coverage of speech that breached a promise
of confidentiality).
41 501 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1991) (holding that the press has "no special immunity
from the application of general laws" and no "privilege to invade the rights and liber-
ties of others").
42 See In re Blood Prods. Litig., 25 F. Supp. 2d at 842. A "law of general applica-
bility" is one that applies to all citizens and does not target the press. See Cohen,
501 U.S. at 670 (concluding that the doctrine of promissory estoppel Is a law of gen-
eral applicability).
43 See In re Blood Prods. Litig., 25 F. Supp. 2d at 842 n.7.
4418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (holding that states may define the appropriate stan-
dard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of a defamatory falsehood which In-
jures a private individual).
45 See In re Blood Prods. Litg., 25 F. Supp. 2d at 844; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346.
46 In re Blood Prods. Litig., 25 F. Supp. 2d at 843 (citing Clift v. Narragansett Tele-
vision, L.P., 688 A.2d 805, 811 (R.I. 1996), which held that, despite the First
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech and press, there is a right to recover in
negligence when a member of the press "causes a person to commit suicide," and
Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 539 P.2d 36, 40 (Cal. 1975), which held that the "First
Amendment does not sanction the infliction of physical injury merely because
achieved by word, rather than act"). See also Risenhoover v. England, 936 F. Supp.
392, 405 (W.D. Tex. 1996) (recognizing that "[p]ractically every tort claim involves
some form of communication" and holding that a "plaintiff is not divested of a cause
of action by the First Amendment merely because a tortfeasor speaks").
[Vol. 2:2
Mar. 20001 FIRST AMENDMEN1'AS A TRADE ASSOCIA7ION SHIELD 473
to show that NHF published calculated falsehoods."'
The court rejected NHF's argument, distinguishing the li-
bel and privacy cases cited by NHF, stating that these con-
text-specific cases applied only to libel suits brought by pub-
lic figures and did not articulate a broad standard for cases
where a defendant is sued for misstatements of fact.4 The
calculus of interests varies in different contexts, the court
reasoned, and thus different standards, including simple
negligence, can suffice to establish liability in certain circum-
stances.49 Although the stringent "calculated falsehood" re-
quirement may be appropriate when a public figure brings a
defamation action alleging dignitary injuries, the court
stressed that this requirement might not be appropriate when
considering redress for the physical injuries alleged in this
case.
50
The court held that "[in this case, the interest of society in
providing redress for the grave injuries alleged should be
weighed against the danger of chilling the NHF's communica-
tions."51 The court also acknowledged that the chilling effect
might be especially great given the large number of plaintiffs
in this case.2 However, the court was not persuaded that the
potential chilling effect on NHF's communications outweighed
society's interest in redressing the kinds of injuries alleged by
the plaintiffs." The court focused on the fact that liability in
this case would not extend to "all the world," because the
case involved an organization that supplied information to its
known membership, a limited community of persons with
hemophilia and their physicians.s"
Further, the court distinguished other cases where courts
found for defendants, despite their publication of misleading
information, reasoning that it was "essential to recognize the
47 Brief of NHF at 4, 9 (No. 93 C 7452) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.
376 U.S. 254. 271-72 (1964)).
48 See In re Blood Prods. Litg., 25 F. Supp. 2d at 844.
49 See Id. (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323. 346 (1974). which de-
clined to apply the New York Times standard when the defamation plaintiff was a
private individual).
50 See id.
51 Id. at 844-45.
52 See id. at 845. The court noted that two other courts have found such a chill-
ing effect to be unacceptable. See id. (citing Tumminello v. Bergen Evening Record.
inc., 454 F. Supp. 1156. 1160 (D.N.J. 1978) (holding that 'the chifflng effect of Im-
posing a high duty of care on those in the business of news dissemination and
making that duty run to a wide range of readers or TIV viewers" would be constitu-
tionally unacceptable) and Gutter v. Dow Jones. Inc.. 490 N.E.2d 898. 901 (Ohio
1986) (citing Tumminelo approvingly)).
See id.
54 See id.
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exact nature of the interests being asserted in this litiga-
tion."55  The court emphasized that this litigation did not
question whether there should be liability for erroneous
communications that are not negligent and do not cause seri-
ous physical injury.'
The court was careful to acknowledge that medical and
scientific opinions can differ with regard to a particular con-
dition or treatment and that liability is not typically imposed
for non-negligent errors in judgment.5 7 However, the court
held that liability should be "imposed upon medical practitio-
ners who fail to use ordinary care in arriving at recommen-
dations that proximately cause injury to patients."8 The
court concluded that "[t]he recommendation is a form of ex-
pression, since it can be conveyed only orally or in writing,
but the First Amendment has never been thought to bar an
action for medical malpractice based on such written or spo-
ken expression in a medical context."59 The court found no
material difference between a medical malpractice action and
the claims presented by persons with hemophilia against
NHF.6°
The court, therefore, correctly held that negligence law
provides a constitutionally acceptable accommodation of the
competing interests asserted in this case and that the First
Amendment does not shield NHF from liability for its negli-
gent acts and omissions.6'
3. Qualified privilege for communications
regarding matters of public concern
Lastly, NHF argued that it was "entitled to First Amend-
ment protection from tort liability when communicating in-
formation and opinions to its chapters regarding issues of
public concern. " " The court rejected this argument, reason-
ing that NHF had presented no authority for such a privi-
lege.'
The court's own review of the relevant cases led it to con-






61 See id. at 846.
Brief of NHF at 2-3 (No. 93 C 7452).
See In re Blood Prods. Litig., 25 F. Supp. 2d at 846.
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its publications dealt with matters of public concern. 6 The
court first considered New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and ac-
knowledged that the Supreme Court held that "[olne of the
reasons the newspaper was given a qualified privilege was
that the advertisement in question was 'an expression of
grievance and protest on one of the major public issues of our
time.' "65 In Time, Inc. v. Hill, the court noted, the Supreme
Court applied the same privilege to an invasion of privacy tort
because the "subject of the publication was 'newsworthy. ' "6
The court, however, turning to Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., explained that "libel suits are not
automatically subject to the heightened standard articulated
by New York Times simply because they involve matters of
public concern."67 The court noted that Dun & Bradstreet af-
firmed the rule that "competing interests must be balanced,
with proper weight being given the type of speech involved. " s
Applying this balancing test, the court explained that it had
given NHF's speech the weight that it deserved and concluded
that the balance favored the governmental interest inprovid-
ing a remedy for negligently inflicted physical injuries.
The denial by the Northern District of minois of NHFs Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment has set a precedent that permits
plaintiffs to sue NHF and other trade associations for negli-
gently communicating ideas or recommendations that cause
physical harm to third parties. In light of this precedent, it is
important for plaintiffs who have been physically injured by
trade association conduct to shape their negligence argu-
ments in a manner that will not only defeat summary judg-
ment motions, but will lead to victories at trial.
IL. NEGLIGENCE ARGUMENTS THAT CAN BE USED AT TRIAL
BY PLAINTIFFS SEEKING To HOLD TRADE ASSOCIATIONS
LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENT ACTS THAT CAUSE PHYSICAL HARM
If other courts follow the Northern District of Illinois' rea-
64 The court acknowledged that the public concern cases it reviewed involved
defamation rather than negligence, and emphasized that it saw no reason not to ap-
ply the analysis of the defamation cases to this case. See Id. at 847-48.
Id. at 846 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254. 271 (1964)).
66 Id. (citing Time, Inc. v. Hill. 385 U.S. 374. 386 (1967)).
67 I& (relying on Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders. Inc.. 472 U.S. 749. 762
(1985) in which a plurality opinion balanced the competing interests and concluded
that a plaintiff construction contractor could recover damages from a credit reporting
agency because the credit agency's statements were not of public concern).
SId"69 See id.
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soning, trade associations will not be able to claim that the
First Amendment shields them from liability for proffering
recommendations negligently. This is only the first hurdle,
however, to holding trade associations liable for their negli-
gent recommendations. Once plaintiffs get to trial, they must
make a prima facie showing of negligence in order to recover
for the injuries they suffered." Such a prima facie case In-
volves a showing of duty, breach, harm and causation. The
Restatement provides plaintiffs with four potential bases for
their negligence claims, under each of which the plaintiffs will
face slightly different burdens.
To show negligence under Restatement section 311, 7'
plaintiffs must show that NHF gratuitously provided them or
their physicians with information, on which NHF knew the
plaintiffs would rely. Plaintiffs will then have to show that
NHF either knew or should have known that the information
provided posed a risk of physical injury to them, and that
their injuries were proximately caused by the negligent mis-
representation. What plaintiffs will not have to show under
section 311 is that NHF undertook a specific task for their
benefit.
Under sections 32372 and 324A7 of the Restatement, the
7o The arguments discussed in this part of the Comment will also be applicable to
plaintiffs in other cases who are seeking a way to hold a trade association or a simi-
lar organization liable for negligent acts that have caused them physical injury. The
Northern District of Illinois did not explicitly address the validity of any of the negli-
gence arguments; it held instead that the First Amendment does not bar causes of
action under these theories. See In re Blood Prods. Litig. F. Supp. 2d at 848 n. 14.SRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION INVOLVING RISK
OF PHYSICAL HARM § 311 (1965). This section provides:
(1) One who negligently gives false information to another Is subject to liability
for physical harm caused by action taken by the other in reasonable reliance
upon such information, where such harm results
(a) to the other, or
(b) to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put in peril by the
action taken.
(2) Such negligence may consist of failure to exercise reasonable care
(a) in ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or
(b) in the manner in which it is communicated.
Id.
72 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: NEGLIGENT PERFORMANCE OF UNDERrAKING TO
RENDER SERVICES § 323 (1965). This section provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the
other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertak-
ing, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertak-
ing.
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plaintiffs will have to show that NHF undertook to render
services directly for their benefit (section 323) or directly for
the benefit of their physicians, with knowledge that such
services were necessary for their protection (section 324A).
Plaintiffs will also have to show that they (section 323) or
their physicians (section 324A) detrimentally relied on NHFs
recommendations. The advantage of making arguments un-
der these two sections is that, depending on the jurisdiction,
the plaintiffs may not have to show that NHF's negligent un-
dertaking was the "but for" cause of contracting HIV. Rather,
it may be sufficient to show that the negligent undertaking
increased the plaintiffs' risk of contracting HIV.
Finally, plaintiffs may argue for NHF liability under section
87674 of the Restatement. Under this section, the plaintiffs'
negligence argument will be based on the premise that NHF
acted in concert with the manufacturers of the blood prod-
ucts to cause their injuries. This argument differs slightly
from the others in that the duty portion of the negligence
claim may be based on the duty of the blood product manu-
facturers to the plaintiffs, not just on NHF's duty to the
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs may argue that NHF knew that the
manufacturers were breaching a duty to them and it assisted
with the breach. Plaintiffs may also argue that NHF assisted
the manufacturers in causing their injuries and that its own
73 RESTATEMNr (SECOND) OF TORTS: LIABiLnY TO THIRD PERSON FOR NEGLIGENT
PERFORMIANCE OF UNDERTAKING § 324A (1965). This section provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third
person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his un-
dertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm.
or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third per-
son, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person
upon the undertaking.
Id.
7, RESrATEMNr (SECOND) OF TORTS: PERSONS ACING IN CONCERT § 876 (1965).
This section provides:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortlous conduct of another, one
is subject to liability if he
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common
design with him, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives
substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself.
or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious re-
sult and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of
duty to the third person.
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conduct constituted a breach of duty under Restatement sec-
tion 311, 323 or 324A. Thus, the section 876 argument may
stand on its own or supplement one of the other arguments.
Whichever route the plaintiffs choose to establish duty under
section 876, they will also have to show that the tortious
conduct of the manufacturers and NHF proximately caused
their injuries.
A. Negligent Misrepresentation: Section 311
Given that NHF is not a typical trade association, in that it
did not control the actions of the blood product manufactur-
ers by setting standards and forcing manufacturer compli-
ance with those standards, 5 plaintiffs may want to first focus
on trying to establish NHF liability for negligent misrepre-
sentation.
The basis of liability under Restatement section 311 will be
the gratuitous provision of information by NHF, upon which
NHF knew consumers would rely, either themselves or
through their physicians, and which NHF either knew or
should have known posed a risk of physical injury to con-
sumers. Courts have never imposed liability upon a trade-
association-type organization on this basis. Thus, plaintiffs
will have to analogize to situations in which liability has been
found for negligent misrepresentation, for example in the ar-
eas of employment recommendations and product endorse-
ments. 6
75 Although associations do not design, manufacture, distribute or sell products.
some courts have held nonetheless that associations have a duty to those who rely
on the association's services. See Snyder v. American Ass'n of Blood Banks, 676
A.2d 1036, 1049 (N.J. 1996) (holding that a blood bank association owed a duty to
transfusion recipients): Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. American Plywood
Ass'n, 1994 WL 463527, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 1994) (holding that the American
Plywood Association owed a duty to homeowners to exercise due care in promulgat-
ing construction standards); FNS Mortgage Serv. Co. v. Pacific Gen. Group. Inc., 29
Cal. Rptr.2d 916, 918 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the International Association
of Plumbing and Mechanical Officials owed a duty to consumers to inspect pipe
manufacturers with due care). But see Meyers v. Donatacci, 531 A.2d 398, 399 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1987) (holding that the National Spa and Pool Institute did not
owe a duty to the general public who used products manufactured or installed by its
members); Beasock v. Dioguardi Enters., Inc., 494 N.Y.S.2d 974, 979 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1985) (holding that the Tire and Rim Association did not owe a duty to the general
public for injuries caused by the product of a member manufacturer).
76 See, e.g., Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 583, 584 (Cal.
1997) (holding an employer liable for injuries caused by its former employee to a
third party plaintiff because the employer negligently failed to disclose the employee's
past sexual improprieties); Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 81 Cal. Rptr. 519, 523 (Cal.
App. 4th 1969) (holding a magazine liable for negligent misrepresentation on the ba-
sis that a third party plaintiff was injured by relying upon its endorsement of a
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Under section 311, plaintiffs will not have to show that
NHF undertook a specific task for their benefit The plaintiffs
will, however, still have to show that the negligent misrepre-
sentations proximately caused them to contract HIV.
Restatement section 311 states:
[olne who negligently gives false information to another is subject
to liability for physical harm caused by action taken by the other
in reasonable reliance upon such information, where harm re-
sults (a) to the other, or (b) to such third persons as the actor
should expect to be put in peril by the action taken.77
Comments following section 311 state that the rule may ap-
ply where physical harm results even though the information
is provided purely gratuitously and is unrelated to any per-
sonal interest of the actor.'
Negligence under section 311 "may consist of a failure to
make a proper inspection or inquiry, or of failure after proper
inquiry to recognize that the information given is not accu-
rate."' A defendant is required, under the reasonable person
standard, to exercise due care under the circumstances to
ascertain the facts and to ensure that the information pro-
vided is accurate given the facts discovered.8 The Restate-
ment comments equate an omission or a failure to disclose
the existence of a known danger with an actual misrepre-
sentation when it should be foreseen that another will rely
upon an appearance of safety.8
The Supreme Court of California combined the Restate-
ment standard with clarifications made by Prosser and Kee-
ton, thus, expanding the tort of negligent misrepresentation
in physical harm cases and establishing a four part test: 1)
Whether the defendant had a duty to use reasonable care in
providing the information; 2) Whether the defendant breached
that duty by failing to exercise reasonable care in ascertain-
ing the accuracy of the information provided or in communi-
cating the information; 3) Whether the plaintiff actually and
reasonably relied on the alleged misrepresentations; and 4)
Whether the misrepresentations proximately caused the
plaintiffs injuries."
product).
77 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: NEGUGENT ISREPRESENATION INVOLVING RISK
OF PHYsICAL HARi § 311 (1) (1965).
7 See &L, cmt. c, at 107.
7 Id., cmt. d, at 108.
8o See&L
81 See W. PAGE KEETON EX AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS. § 33 at
207 (5th ed. 1984).
See Garcia v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 960. 963-65 (Cal. 1990). Other states
JOURNAL OF CONSTITrTONAL LAW
The California Supreme Court further expanded the negli-
gent misrepresentation standard in Randi W. v. Muroc Joint
Unified Schoo!. While this case addressed the standard in
the context of letters of employment reference, it provides ar-
guments that may be made by analogy in the NHF situation.
The standard provides that employers owe a duty to prospec-
tive employers and third parties not to misrepresent the de-
scriptions and qualifications of a former employee, if making
such representations would create a "substantial, foreseeable
risk of physical injury" to third parties.8' Breach of this duty
can be established by showing that the employer made an
unqualified recommendation and failed to disclose other facts
that materially qualified the recommendation." A third per-
son need not allege that she relied on the employer's repre-
sentations directly; she only needs to allege that her injury
resulted from action taken by the recipient of the misrepre-
sentations in reliance on them.m This expansion may be
critical to the plaintiffs' arguments if they cannot show that
they personally relied on NHF's representations.
Arguing by analogy, if a court were to adopt a standard
similar to this in the context of information provided by asso-
ciations like NHF, the plaintiffs would have to establish that
NHF owed a duty because it provided information that pre-
sented a substantial, foreseeable risk of physical injury to
third persons. Plaintiffs would then be able to establish
breach by pointing to specific misrepresentations that reflect
negligent communication of information by NHF or negligent
failure to properly investigate the accuracy of the information
provided. Breach could also be established by showing that
NHF unqualifiedly recommended continued factor use while
failing to disclose other facts that would have materially
qualified this recommendation. In establishing causation,
plaintiffs would have the option of showing that either they
relied on the information provided by NHF or their medical
providers relied on such information.s7 To complete the cau-
have also adopted the Restatement standard from section 311 for negligent misrep-
resentation. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. A, C & S, Inc.. 546 N.E.2d 580 (IMI. 1989).
83 929 P.2d 583, 591 (Cal. 1997).
84 Id. at 591.
8 See d.
86 See i. at 594 (finding that the employer's reliance on the negligent misrepre-
sentation in the letter of recommendation sufficed to establish the reliance element
of the third party plaintiffs claim); see also Golden Spread Council, Inc. v. Akins,
926 S.W.2d 287, 291 (Tex. 1996) (holding that, having undertaken to recommend a
potential scoutmaster for a church, Golden Spread Council had a duty to use rea-
sonable care in doing so to prevent an unreasonable risk of harm to others).
87 See Randl W., 929 P.2d at 594.
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sation prong of the negligent misrepresentation argument,
plaintiffs will have to show that absent their reliance on
NHF's recommendations they likely would not have con-
tracted HlV.
B. Negligent Performance of a Voluntary Undertaking:
Section 323
Section 323 of the Restatement provides another possible
argument for NHF liability. Unlike section 311, under this
section plaintiffs will have to show that NHF undertook to
provide services for their benefit. The section provides that a
defendant
who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render
services to another which he should recognize as necessary for
the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liabil-
ity to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to ex-
ercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if (a) his fail-
ure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or (b)
the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the
undertaking.8
Plaintiffs will argue that Section 323 is applicable to NHF
because it undertook to render services directly for their
benefit, and it performed those services negligently. Plaintiffs
will then argue that they contracted HIV because of their det-
rimental reliance on that negligent undertaking and that the
negligent undertaking increased their risk of contracting
HIV.' This section provides an advantage to plaintiffs be-
cause, depending on the jurisdiction, the plaintiffs may not
have to show that the negligent undertaking proximately
caused them to contract HIV. Rather, it may be sufficient to
show that the negligent undertaking increased the plaintiffs
risk of contracting HIV.
Many states have adopted section 323 as law.
9" For the
88 RESTATEMEN (SECOND) OF TORTS: NEGUGENT PERFORMANCE OF UNDERA{ING TO
RENDERSERVICES § 323 (1965).
In In re Blood Products Litigation plaintiffs allege the following: NHF undertook
to educate hemophiliacs and their physicians regarding the treatment of hemophilia
in light of the risk of contracting HIV: NHF established itself as a clearinghouse for
information about HV; NHF induced hemophiliacs and their physicians to rely on its
treatment recommendations; NHF continued to recommend that hemophiliacs treat
their bleeding episodes with factor concentrates after a time when it knew such
products were transmitting HIV. See Plaintiffs' Brief at 29-30.
See, e.g., Green v. Unity Sch. of Christianity. 991 S.W.2d 201. 205 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1999) (adopting section 323 as the standard for Missouri Law): Uoyd v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. ins. Co., 860 P.2d 1300. 1305 (Ariz. CL App. 1993) (same for Ari-
zona law) Frye v. Medicare-Glaser Corp.. 579 N.E.2d 1255 (11m. App. Ct. 1991) (same
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sake of simplicity this section will focus on the law of Penn-
sylvania because it should be favorable to the plaintiff hemo-
philiacs who are trying their suits in that state. Pennsylvania
courts have established that a plaintiff proceeding under sec-
tion 323 must establish the underlying elements of an action
in negligence:" a cognizable legal duty or obligation requiring
the actor to adhere to a certain standard of conduct; a failure
to conform to the required standard; causation between the
conduct and the resulting injury; and actual loss or damage
to another party's interests.9
1. Duty under section 323
Under section 323, to show that NHF owed them a duty,
plaintiffs will have the burden of showing that the association
undertook to provide services directly for their benefit. In
establishing duty under section 323, plaintiffs must focus on
the professed intention of the association's undertaking.
For example, in Gunsalus v. Celotex,"3 the plaintiff argued
under section 323 that the "Tobacco Institute 'undertook the
task of collecting and disseminating scientific, medical and
other information about tobacco to the public.. .'" and was
negligent in performing this task. The court held that the
Tobacco Institute's statements that it would aid and assist in
research efforts were insufficient to create a duty to inform
the plaintiff of all dangers related to cigarette smoking, in
part because the plaintiff did not show that the Tobacco In-
stitute's failure to fulfill its promises increased the risk of
harm to the plaintiff.95 The court determined that the plaintiff
had not detrimentally relied on the Institute's alleged under-
taking because there were other sources of information on
the dangers of smoking available, and because the plaintiffs
doctor had advised him to stop smoking several times. 6
In Friedman v. F.E. Myers, Co.,97 the court found that an
association of water pump manufacturers owed the plaintiff
for Illinois law); Gradel v. Inouye, 421 A.2d 674 (Pa. 1980) (same for Pennsylvania
law).
See Morena v. South Hills Health Sys., 462 A.2d 680, 684 (Pa. 1983) ("[This
section] does not.., change the burden of a plaintiff to establish the underlying
elements of an action in negligence, nor can it be invoked to create a duty where one
does not exist.") (footnote omitted).
See id. at n.5 (establishing the elements in a negligence action).
93 674 F. Supp. 1149 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
9 Id. at 1156.
95 See id. at 1157.
9 See ic.
97 706 F. Supp. 376 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
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no duty under section 323 because the association did not
undertake a "specific task" for the benefit of the plaintiff."
Furthermore, the court held that even if the association did
undertake to inform the public about well-pump contami-
nants, there was no evidence that the plaintiff relied on the
association's performance.9
These cases demonstrate that, in order to establish duty
under section 323, the plaintiffs in In re Blood Products Litiga-
tion will have to show several things. First, they will need to
show that NHF undertook to provide services that it intended
to directly benefit hemophiliacs. Plaintiffs will then need to
show that NHF induced reliance on its research and its dis-
semination of information and recommendations regarding
HIV and factor concentrate usage." If a court finds both of
these elements, it is likely to find that NHF owed the plaintiffs
a duty.
2. Causation under section 323
While establishing duty under section 323 may be more
difficult for plaintiffs, because they will need to show a spe-
cific undertaking for their benefit,"0 causation may be easier
to establish than it would be under section 311.
In jurisdictions that take the same approach as the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court, plaintiffs may establish causation
by showing only that NHFs negligent performance of its vol-
untary undertaking increased their risk of harm. The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court has held that when section 323(a),
implicating increased risk of harm, is applicable, it "relaxes
the degree of certainty ordinarily required of a plaintiffs evi-
dence to provide a basis upon which the jury may find cau-
sation.""° Once a plaintiff shows that a defendant's acts or
omissions have increased the potential of harm to another, a
fact-finder may find, without further proof of causation, that
98 See id. at 383.
99 See d. (holding that trade association owed the plaintiff/consumer no duty).
100 For example, NHF billed itself as an advocacy group for hemophiliacs and
claimed to be a clearinghouse for information on HIV and hemophilia. NHF news-
letters gave specific recommendations for physicians to follow and directed hemo-
philiacs to contact NHF directly with any HIV questions. Arguably both plaintiffs
and their treaters were deterred from researching HV/hemophilla issues themselves
or looking for other sources of information about these Issues because NHF held It-
self out as a reliable authority. Plaintiffs' Brief at 5-10.
10 See Patentas v. United States, 687 F.2d 707, 716 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that
under Pennsylvania law, a good Samaritan who voluntarily undertakes a task may
notperform that task negligently).
'0 Gradel v. Inouye, 421 A.2d 674, 678 (Pa. 1980).
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such increased risk was a substantial factor in bringing
about the resultant harm. °3 This precedent"" will be helpful
to the plaintiffs because showing that NHF's negligent per-
formance of its gratuitous undertaking increased their risk of
contracting HIV will be much easier than establishing that
NHF's negligence was the "but for" cause of the contraction.
C. Liability to a Third Person for Negligent Performance
of a Voluntary Undertaking: Section 324A
Plaintiffs may also make a negligence argument under
section 324A of the Restatement. This section, like section
323, requires plaintiffs to show a specific undertaking by NHF
in order to establish duty. Under section 324A, plaintiffs can
show that NHF undertook to provide services for the physi-
cians of hemophiliacs (rather than for the hemophiliacs
themselves) that the association knew were necessary for the
protection of third-party hemophiliacs. Section 324A also
provides, however, the potential causation advantage of sec-
tion 323, because, depending on the jurisdiction, plaintiffs
may only need to show that the negligent undertaking in-
creased their risk of contracting HIV. Section 324A provides
that a defendant
who undertakes gratuitously, or for consideration, to render
services to another which he should recognize as necessary for
the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liabil-
ity to the third person for physical harm resulting from his fail-
ure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if (a)
his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such
harm; or (b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the
other to the third person; or (c) the harm is suffered because of
reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking.'O
Many states have adopted section 324A as law.'0
103 See Hamfl v. Bashllne, 392 A.2d 1280, 1288 (Pa. 1978). In that case the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court held that:
once a plaintiff has demonstrated that defendant's acts or omissions.., have
increased the risk of harm to another, such evidence furnishes a basis for the
fact-finder to go further and find that such increased risk was in turn a sub-
stantial factor in bringing about the resultant harm; the necessary proximate
cause will have been made out If the jury sees fit to find cause In fact.
Id.
104 Unfortunately, many states do not follow this approach, so each plaintiff must
carefully examine the law of his/her jurisdiction before making the causation argu-
ment.
105 RESTATEMENr (SECOND) OF TORTS: LIABILITY TO THIRD PERSON FOR NEGLIGENT
PERFORMANCE OF UNDERTAKING § 324A (1965).
106 See generally Huggins v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 264 S.E.2d 191, 192 (Ga.
1980) (establishing section 324A as the appropriate statement of the law In Georgia):
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Thus, in these states, when a trade association, acting
voluntarily or for consideration, agrees to render services to
its member manufacturers ' °7 that affect the safety of third
party consumers, the third party consumers may sustain an
action under section 324A. The plaintiffs in the In re Blood
Products Liability lawsuit may argue that section 324A should
be applied in their case because NHF breached a duty to
them by negligently promulgating treatment recommenda-
tions for their physicians, which proximately caused them to
contract HIV. Duty and causation are discussed separately
and in more detail in this section because there is more case
law addressing section 324A than the other Restatement sec-
tions discussed in this Comment, and because the duty and
causation arguments under section 324A may be easily con-
fused.
1. Establishing duty under section 324A'
In arguing that NHF breached a duty under section 324A,
plaintiffs may use case law establishing that associations owe
a duty to third parties whose safety is potentially implicated
by the actions of the members of the association. Plaintiffs
may then analogize those cases to its situation, arguing that
NHF was the association and the physicians of hemophiliacs
were its members.
In most jurisdictions, plaintiffs should be able to find
cases which have established that trade associations owe a
duty to third parties. For example, in Martinez v. Perlite Insti-
tute,"°9 the court held that a defendant trade association owed
a duty to third persons because it had specifically under-
taken to test a member company's perlite ores for dangerous
toxic substances.1 °
Pippin v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 399 N.E.2d 596. 600 (I. 1979) (same for Uilnois);
Walsh v. Pagra Air Taxi, Inc., 282 N.W.2d 567, 570-71 (MInn. 1979) (same for M11in-
nesota).
'07 The services performed by trade associations in these cases usually consist of
product certification, safety inspections. or standards promulgation. See. e.g.. To-
man v. Underwriters Labs., Inc.. 707 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1983) (product certification):
Patentas v. United States, 687 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1982) (safety inspection): Heinrich
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 532 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Md. 1982) (standards promul-
gation).
108 See generally Ralph G. Wellington & Vance G. Camisa. The Trade Associatibn
and Product Safety Standards: Of Good Samaritans and Liabflfty. 1990 DEF. LJ. I
(examining trade association liability for negligent promulgation of safety standards).
109 120 Cal. Rptr. 120 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
1Ho See id. at 125.
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In Hall v. E.L Du Pont De Nemours & Co.,"' the court held
that the blasting cap industry's trade association could be
held liable to third party plaintiffs because the manufacturers
had delegated the duty of monitoring the safety of the blast-
ing caps to the association.1 12 The court emphasized that It
was "entirely reasonable for the individual manufacturers to
delegate this function to a jointly-sponsored, jointly-financed
association."1 1 3 Furthermore, the court found that the asso-
ciation should not be absolved of liability for negligently per-
forming its delegated duties. 4 In similar situations, other
courts have held that Good Housekeeping and Underwriters'
Laboratories, organizations similar to trade associations be-
cause they certify products, may owe a duty to third per-
sons.
115
The court in Rick v. RLC Corp."6 discussed the basic re-
quirements necessary to establish a duty under section
324A." 7 The court held that whether a defendant's under-
taking is gratuitous or contractual, the evidence must show
that the defendant assumed an obligation or intended to ren-
der services for the benefit of another. 8 The court also held
that plaintiffs alleging a negligently promulgated safety stan-
dard need to show that the standard was established for the
specific product that caused the injury." 9 Finally, the court
held that plaintiffs must show that it was foreseeable that
they would be injured by the defendant's "failure to perform
the undertaking with reasonable care."' 20
Trade associations often act in an advisory capacity in
promulgating manufacturing/safety recommendations.121 For
111 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
112 See id. at 378.
113 Id. at 359.
114 See id at 386.
115 See Toman v. Underwriters Labs., Inc., 707 F.2d 620, 621 (1st Cir. 1983)
(holding that Underwriters Laboratories (UL) owed a duty to purchasers of a hair-
dryer that UL certified as safe); Hanberry v. Hearst Co., 81 Cal. Rptr. 519, 522-23
(Cal. App. 4th 1969) (holding that the publishers of Good Housekeeping Magazine
owed a duty to consumers of shoes that the magazine guaranteed as safe).
116 535 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
17 See id. at 45.
118 See id.
119 Compare Muniz v. National Can Corp., 737 F.2d 145, 149 (1st Cir. 1984) (find-
ing that no duty was proven where a parent corporation provided general safety
guidelines "not specifically directed" to the instrument that caused plaintiffs injury),
with Heinrich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 532 F. Supp. 1348, 1354 (D. Md.
1982) (holding that a duty may exist when a parent corporation provided safety in-
formation specifically directed to the instrument that caused the plaintiffs Injury).
120 Rick, 535 F. Supp. at 43 (citing Smith v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 303 N.W.2d
702, 712 (Mich. 1981).
121 See generally GEORGE LAMB & CARRINGTON SHIELDS, TRADE ASSOCIATION LAW AND
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this reason, some courts have found that a trade associa-
tion's promulgation of such recommendations does not es-
tablish a duty."= Nevertheless, industry compliance with rec-
ommendations promulgated by trade associations is typically
so consistent that such recommendations essentially become
mandatory operation standards.
Several courts have found that trade association duty ex-
isted solely on the basis of negligent promulgation of stan-
dards that were followed by a member, and subsequently
caused a third party to be injured.' 23 For example, a district
court in Florida, while not basing its finding on section 324A,
found that the American Plywood Association (APA) owed a
"duty to homeowners to exercise due care in promulgating
construction standards."" APA advocated "use of plywood
roof sheathing" and "an unreasonably dangerous nailing
pattern in an effort to increase the sales and profits of [its]
members who manufacture[d] structural wood panels.
"
APA placed the blame for the harm suffered by consumers on
the building code that the plaintiff homeowner had to follow;,
the court, however, reasoned that since APA held itself out as
a research and testing agency, the code itself justifiably relied
on APA recommendations." Thus, even though compliance
with the standards promulgated by APA was not mandatory,
the court still held APA liable.
The Supreme Court of Alabama relied on section 324A in
finding that the National Spa and Pool Institute (NSPI) owed a
duty to third party consumers not to promulgate standards
for pool design and construction negligently. The court
PRACTICE 77-78 (Trade Regulation Series, rev. ed. 197 1).
122 See, e.g., Blalock v. Syracuse Stamping Co.. 584 F. Supp. 454. 456-57 (E.D. Pa.
1984) ('The threshold issue under § 324A is whether the party charged undertook a
duty to the person for whom services were allegedly performed or to an injured third
party."); Meyers v. Donnatacci, 531 A.2d 398. 403 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Dlv. 1987)
(stating that promulgating advisory standards for industry members does not create
a duty to third parties); Beasock v. Dioguardi Enters. Inc.. 494 N.Y.S.2d 974. 979
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (stating that, at a minimum, to find a third party liable for acts
of another, a plaintiff must prove that the third party had "a relationship with the
tortfeasor sufficient to exercise control over the culpable conduct" to establish that a
duT existed).
See, e.g., Prudential Property and Cas. v. American Plywood Ass'n. No. 932026.
1994 WL 463527, at *3 (S.D. Fl. Aug. 3, 1994) (finding that the American Plywood
Association owed a duty to consumers because it promulgated standards which af-
fected their well-being).
'24 Id. at '3 (finding that the APA had a duty to exercise due care in promulgating
standards).
125 Id. at *1.
126 See I. at '3.
127 See King v. National Spa and Pool Inst., 570 So.2d 612 (Ala. 1990). revd on
other grounds. 578 So.2d 1285 (Ala. 1991).
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found that NSPI could be held liable for the injury that the
plaintiff sustained while diving into a defective pool if the pool
manufacturer relied on negligently-formulated NSPI stan-
dards in constructing or installing the pool.1" Although NSPI
voluntarily undertook to create and disseminate standards to
its members for the purpose of influencing their design and
construction practices, it was foreseeable that harm might re-
sult to consumers if due care was not exercised.1 29 Again,
compliance with NSPI standards was not mandatory, but be-
cause this particular manufacturer did rely on those stan-
dards and this reliance caused the plaintiffs injury, NSPI was
held liable.
Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the
American Association of Blood Banks (AABB) owed a duty of
care to a consumer who contracted HIV from contaminated
blood products. 3 While the court did not focus on section
324A, the duty of care issues paralleled those in King. Plain-
tiffs alleged in this case that AABB promulgated regulations
for its members and should have foreseen that those regula-
tions would impact the safety of third-party consumers.' In
finding that AABB owed a duty of care to blood product re-
cipients, the court focused on the unique and dominant role
of the AABB in the blood banking industry and the extent of
its control over its members. 32 The court recognized that
AABB, while claiming to be a charitable organization, repre-
sented the interests of its members, and at stake for its
members was a substantial financial interest in the regula-
tion of the industry.'13 Further, the court emphasized that
AABB sought and cultivated responsibility for the safety of
the nation's blood supply; it thus owed a duty to those who
relied on it to use due care in promulgating its blood bank
regulations."" Lastly, the court found that AABB should have
foreseen that its failure to exercise due care by not recom-
mending surrogate testing of donors for HIV would result in
injury to the plaintiff.'34
The plaintiffs in In re Blood Products Litigation, and the
plaintiffs in any other suits against a trade association under
128 See d. at 614.
129 See id. at 616.
130 See Snyder v. American Ass'n of Blood Banks, 676 A.2d 1036, 1049 (N.J.
1996).
131 See i. at 1038.
132 See fi. at 1050.
133 See id.
13 See ur.
135 See i. at 1048.
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section 324A, must first determine the scope of the trade as-
sociation's undertaking; this will then define the scope of the
trade association's duty.36 In the case of NHF, plaintiff he-
mophiliacs can argue that NHF undertook to promulgate he-
mophilia/HlIV treatment standards for the benefit of member
physicians who cared for persons with hemophilia and that
these standards were uniformly followed by the industry.
Plaintiffs can further argue that NHF knew or should have
known that the standards it promulgated would impact the
safety of persons with hemophilia.
2. Establishing causation under section 324A
Once plaintiffs have established NHFs duty and breach
under section 324A, they will have to establish that the
breach more likely than not caused their injury. To establish
causation, plaintiffs will have to show one of the following: (a)
the trade association's failure to exercise reasonable care in
promulgating standards increased the risk of injury that
plaintiffs suffered; '7 (b) the trade association undertook to
perform a duty owed by the member manufacturers to the
plaintiffs;13 8 or (c) the trade associations induced the plain-
tiffs, or the member manufacturers, to rely upon the trade
association's undertaking, which, in turn, caused plaintiffs
injuries.1 Although intricately linked to the question of
duty, these sections of 324A are usually applied in the cau-
sation analysis.' 40
a. Section 324A(a): Increased risk of harm
In some jurisdictions, plaintiffs may establish causation
under section 324A(a) the same way they may establish cau-
138 See, e.g., Blessing v. United States. 447 F. Supp. 1160. 1189-1190 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (stating that in similar factual situations, the Third Circuit followed the rule
that "duty is measured by undertaking).
137 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: LIABILITY TO THIRD PERSON FOR NEGUGEUt
PERFORMANCE OF UNDERTAKING § 324A(a) (1965).
138 See &dL at § 324A(b).
13a See &L. at § 324A(c); see also Canipe v. Nat'l Loss Control Serv. Corp.. 736 F.2d
1055,1062 (5th Cir. 1984) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment on
the basis that a jury could find that the defendant performed Its inspection of plain-
tiffs employer's premises negligently and that this negligence proximately caused
plaintiffs injuries).
140 See generally Ricci v. Quality Bakers. 556 F. Supp. 716. 720 n.10 (D. Del.
1983) ("Courts and commentators have construed the provisional requirements of
section 324A to state the requirements of the scope of a third party's duty to others
or to state the requirements of proximate cause) (emphasis added).
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sation under section 323, by showing that NHF's negligent
performance of its voluntary undertaking increased their risk
of contracting HIV. The courts vary in their application of
section 324A(a), but causation has been found where an as-
sociation promulgates a safety standard or endorses a prod-
uct that increases the risk of injury to a third party.1
4
'
For example, in Hempstead v. General Fire Extinguisher
Corp.,142 the court found Underwriters Laboratory (UL) liable
under section 324A(a) for injury caused to a third person by
the explosion of a fire extinguisher labeled by UL." 3 The
court focused on the arrangement between the manufacturer
and UL, which provided that UL would prescribe standards of
construction which would render the product safe for use.
1 44
UL was held liable because it failed to use reasonable care in
approving the extinguisher's design, which increased the risk
of harm to the plaintiff.1
4
1
More recently, a California court held the International As-
sociation of Plumbing and Mechanical Officials (IAPMO) liable
under section 324A(a) to a plaintiff injured by a certified
faulty pipe because it undertook to inspect pipe manufactur-
ers and de-list those that did not "adhere to [the] standards
it... promulgated."'4 The court held that "IAPMO's failure to
exercise reasonable care in its undertakings increaseld] the
risk of harm to... consumers from defective pipe that other-
wise would have been removed from the stream of com-
merce.147
Some courts require a specific showing that the safety rec-
ommendation and/or inspection changed the plaintiffs envi-
ronment for the worse before they will find 324A(a) liability.
In Patentas v. United States,'4 the court held that a Coast
Guard inspection of a tanker that later exploded was not
enough to establish 324A(a) liability because there were only
141 See, e.g., Kohr v. Johns-Manville Corp.. 534 F. Supp. 256, 258 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(holding that an insurance company study group drew conclusions about asbestos
exposure without reasonable care, thus increasing the risk of harm to the plaintiff
through its recommendations); see also, Heinrich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
532 F. Supp. 1348, 1355 (D. Md. 1982) (explaining that the mere recommendation of
standards can result in liability under section 324A(a)).
142 69 F. Supp. 109 (D. Del. 1967).
143 See Ud at 118.
14 See i at 117.
145 See Id. at 118.
146 FNS Mortgage v. Pacific Gen. Group, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 921 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994).
147 Id.
148 687 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1982).
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signs of omission- not commission. 49 The court explained
that increased risk of harm means "some... change to the
environment or some other material alteration of circum-
stances."'50 The court held that although the Coast Guard in-
spected the tanker, it did not change the environment of the
plaintiffs simply by doing so.' s'
Quoting the Patentas "omission/commission" language,
the court in Ricci v. Quality Bakers,'" found that the defen-
dant was not liable under 324A(a) because the hazard alleged
to have caused the injury existed independently of any negli-
gent inspection or recommendation of the defendant." The
court noted that, at worst, defendant's alleged conduct "per-
mitted the continuation of an existing risk."'F
Courts have applied these standards inconsistently to de-
termine whether a trade association or similar entity in-
creased a plaintiffs risk of harm via promulgation of a safety
recommendation and/or inspection. However, where trade
association recommendations are considered mandatory, it
should be enough to establish negligent promulgation of
those recommendations to show that defendant's act caused
plaintiffs injury. Under this principle, plaintiffs can establish
NHF liability by showing that it negligently established a
treatment standard that increased their risk of harm.
b. Section 324A(b): Undertaking to perform a duty owed by
another
In contrast to section 324A(a), under which plaintiffs have
the lesser burden of showing that NHF increased their risk of
harm, under section 324A(b) the plaintiffs must show that
NHF caused their harm by negligently performing a duty
owed to them by their physicians. Plaintiffs will be able to
establish causation if they can show that NHF undertook to
perform part of the duty owed them by their physicians when
NHF recommended continued treatment with factor concen-
trate.
Examples of such causation can be found in cases in
which courts have held that, by creating product safety stan-
dards, certifying a product, or performing a safety inspection,
149 See id. at 716 ("Their critical defect is the appellants' Inability to Identify signs
of commission rather than omission.").
15 Id. at 717.
151 See i.
152 556 F. Supp. 716 (D. Del. 1983).
153 See id. at 720.
'54It. (internal quotations omitted).
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a trade association attempts to perform a duty that a manu-
facturer or other entity usually owes to consumers. The
finding of causation is based on the conclusion that, absent
the negligent undertaking of the duty by the association, the
plaintiff would not have suffered harm.
According to some courts, section 324A(b) is applicable as
long as the party who owes the plaintiff a duty of care has
delegated to the defendant any part of that duty. 1 In Hill v.
James Walker Memorial Hospital,157 a hospital hired an exter-
minating company to rid the hospital of rats, and the plaintiff
was injured when she fell upon seeing a rat"tm The court held
that the exterminating company could be found liable be-
cause it had undertaken to perform a certain aspect of the
hospital's duty to its patients to exercise reasonable care for
their safety. 5 9 Thus, in jurisdictions following this standard,
liability attaches when a trade association accepts responsi-
bility for any part of a duty owed to a third party. Under this
interpretation of 324A(b), the plaintiffs in this case can es-
tablish causation by showing that part of the physicians' du-
ties of care to persons with hemophilia was delegated to NHF.
This argument will not prevail, however, in jurisdictions
that find causation only upon a showing that the trade asso-
ciation completely undertook the responsibility of the manu-
facturers. For example, the court in Blessing v. United
States'6° held that the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
trade association's inspection was "on behalf of and in lieu of'
the employer's inspection to prove that the trade association's
acts caused the plaintiffs harm.1 6 1 The District of Maryland
applied the Blessing rationale in Heinrich v. Goodyear Tire
and Rubber Co.'62 to hold that the plaintiffs failed to establish
causation when they did not allege that the defendant com-
155 For example, in FNS Mortgage v. Pacific General Group, the court found that
IAPMO, by inspecting pipe manufacturers and delisting those that did not adhere to
Its standards, had undertaken to perform a duty owed by local building officials to
consumers. See 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 921 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). The consumers
suffered harm because of the local building official's reliance on IAPMO. See d.
1 See, e.g., Canipe v. National Loss Control Serv. Corp., 736 F.2d 1055, 1061 (5th
Cir. 1984) (finding that liability may result if the employer delegated any part of its
duty to a trade association): Santillo v. Chambersburg Eng'g Co., 603 F. Supp. 211.
215 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (holding that the defendant was delegated a portion of another
party's duty of care).
157 407 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir. 1969).
15 See Id. at 1038.
159 See Id. at 1042.
160 447 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
161 See Ed. at 1193-94.
i 532 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Md. 1982).
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pletely assumed the employer's duty." Under these prece-
dents, it will be more difficult for plaintiff hemophiliacs to
establish causation because they will have to show that NHF
completely undertook to perform the duties of their physi-
cians.
c. Section 324A(c): Reliance
Under the third provision of section 324A. a court may
find causation where the third person suffers harm because
of reliance upon the defendant's undertaking. The meaning
of reliance is clarified by the comments to 324A, which re-
quire the injury to result because the person to whom the
service is rendered or the third person decided to forego other
risk-reducing measures.1 64 In In re Blood Products Litigation,
plaintiff hemophiliacs will have to establish that their physi-
cians, in relying on NHFs treatment recommendations, for-
went either establishing their own safety standards or the
opportunity to follow someone else's safety recommenda-tions. 165
Some courts have held that reliance is not established
merely because safety recommendations were made and im-
plemented.'6 These courts require some evidence of a change
in position, but they vary with regard to the degree of change
required. Some courts have held that the reliance element of
subsection (c) is satisfied if, in relying on the defendant's un-
dertaking, the manufacturer neglects or reduces its own
safety program."
This interpretation will be helpful to plaintiffs' arguments
for trade association liability because trade association stan-
163 See &L at 1355.
164 RESTATEMWNT (SECOND) OF TORTS: LZABILIY TO THIRD PERSON FOR NEGLIGENr
PERFORMIANCE OF UNDERTAKMNG § 324A (1965) cmL e (1965).
165 See, e.g., Wellington & Camisa. supra note 108. at 18: see aLso Patentas v.
United States, 687 F.2d 707, 717 (3d Cir. 1982) (citing comment e of section 324A(c)
and holding that the plaintiffs would also have to allege that their knowledge of de-
fendant's undertaking induced them to forego other remedies or precautions against
the risk).
16 See, e.g., Blalock v. Syracuse Stamping Co.. 584 F. Supp. 454. 456-58 (E.D. Pa.
1984) (finding no reliance because there was no evidence that the employer had
abandoned other safety measures based on insurance company recommendations).
167 See Canipe v. National Loss Control Serv. Corp.. 736 F.2d 1055. 1063 (5th Cir.
1984) (holding that downgrading rather than eliminating employers' own safety pro-
gram is enough to establish reliance under section 324A(c)): see also Stacy v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 484 F.2d 289. 295 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that 324A (c) liability
may be found where employer neglected its own safety inspection program): Hein-
rich, 532 F. Supp. at 1356 (holding that liability may be imposed if employer less-
ened its own safety measures).
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dards are often nationally recognized and universally followed
within the industry. Thus, it is unlikely that an entity relying
on those recommendations will maintain as rigorous a safety
program as it would have in the absence of the trade associa-
tion's standards. In In re Blood Products Litigation, to estab-
lish causation under this provision, plaintiffs must show that
their physicians at least partially relied on NHF to research
and minimize the risks associated with continued treatment
with factor concentrate in the light of the potential for con-
tracting HIV.
D. Concert of Action: Section 876
Concert of action provides plaintiffs with a fourth argu-
ment to support their claims for trade association liability.
Under this section, the plaintiffs' negligence argument will be
based on the premise that NHF acted in concert with the
manufacturers of the blood products to cause their injuries.
This argument is somewhat different from the section 311,
323, and 324A arguments in that the duty portion of the
negligence claim may be based on the duty of the blood prod-
uct manufacturers to the plaintiffs, not just on NHF's duty to
the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs may argue that NHF knew that the
manufacturers were breaching a duty to them and that NHF
assisted with the breach. Plaintiffs may also argue that NHF
assisted the manufacturers in causing their injuries and that
NHF's own conduct constituted a breach of duty under Re-
statement section 311, 323 or 324A. Thus, the section 876
argument can stand on its own or work in tandem with one of
the other arguments.
To establish duty under section 876, plaintiffs will have to
show that the tortious conduct of the manufacturers and
NHF proximately caused their injuries. Section 876 provides
that
[flor harm resulting to a third person from the conduct of an-
other, one is subject to liability if he: (a) does a tortious act in
concert with another or pursuant to a common design with
him; ... (b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach
of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the
other... or (c) gives substantial assistance to the other in ac-
complishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately
considered, constitutes breach of duty to the third person.1 6
8 REsATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PERSONs AcTING IN CONcERT § 876 (1965): see
generally Burnside v. Abbot Labs., 505 A.2d 973, 982 (Pa. Super. 1985) (examining
concert of action liability).
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The agreement between the parties need not be expressed
in words, but may be implied and understood to exist from
the conduct itself.'6 The Restatement emphasizes that if the
encouragement or assistance is a substantial factor in caus-
ing the resulting tort, the one giving it is himself a tortfeasor
and is responsible for the other's intentional or negligent
acts.
170
Where all defendants agreed, in either an express or im-
plied manner, to take part in a common scheme to commit a
tortious act, courts may impute a concert of action to find li-
ability.17 1 However, in order to sustain a claim for concert of
action, unlike one for conspiracy, the plaintiff must show un-
derlying tortious conduct by both parties. ' 7
The requisite underlying tortious conduct was found in
University System of New Hampshire v. United States Gyp-
sum,"1 in which the plaintiff successfully alleged that the de-
fendants' underlying conduct, fraudulent concealment of in-
formation regarding asbestos, was tortious.' 4 A New York
court held that lead paint manufacturers and their trade as-
sociation could be held liable under the theory of concert of
action if evidence showed that they coordinated efforts to
conceal the hazards associated with lead paint, misled the
public as to that hazard, and continued to market and pro-
mote the use of lead paint despite their knowledge of the haz-
ards.
1m
With regard to NHF liability under section 876(b), plaintiffs
can argue that NHF knew that the manufacturers of factor
concentrate were breaching a duty to persons with hemo-
philia and that NHF provided assistance in committing that
breach or encouraged the breach by recommending that per-
sons with hemophilia continue treating with factor concen-
1 RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PERSONS ACTNG IN COI.CERT § 876. cmt. a
(1965); see also, Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co.. 436 N.E.2d 182. 188-89 (N.Y. 1982) (con-
cluding that the jury may infer that a drug company effectively encouraged conduct
by others by not adequately testing its product despite finding that the drug com-
pan7 y did not consciously encourage conduct by other companies).
RESrATEM ET (SECOND) OF TORTS: PERSONS ACTING IN CONCEr" § 876. cmt. b
(1965).
171 See, e.g., Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.. 539 N.E.2d 1069. 1073 (N.Y. 1989) (noting
that concerted action liability exists where one company's actions assist in keeping
another's defective products in the stream of commerce).
1 See, e.g., Cresser v. American Tobacco Co.. 662 N.Y.S.2d 374 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1997) (comparing concerted action and conspiracy and holding that there were al-
leged intentional torts to support a claim for concerted action).
756 F. Supp. 640 (D.N.H. 1991).
174 See id. at 652.
175 See City of New York v. Lead Indus. Ass'n. Inc.. 597 N.Y.S.2d 698. 700 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1993).
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trate. Plaintiffs may also argue that NHF is liable under sec-
tion 876(c), on the basis that it provided substantial assis-
tance to the manufacturers in accomplishing a tortious re-
sult, and that its own conduct constituted a breach of duty to
persons with hemophilia under Restatement sections 311,
323, or 324A.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Northern District of Illinois correctly struck down
NHF's First Amendment motion for summary judgment on
the basis that, among other things, NHF should be subject to
laws of general applicability. However, it is now up to the
injured plaintiffs to defeat NHF's First Amendment defenses
and establish its liability for negligence in their respective tri-
als. As discussed above, potential arguments can be made
under Restatement section 311 for negligent misrepresenta-
tion, Restatement sections 323 and 324A for negligent per-
formance of a voluntary undertaking, or under Restatement
section 876 for concert of action.
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